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PUBLIC LAW
such sales. In cases involving this problem of sales of building
materials the courts of last resort in the several states have been
divided on the point,13 and the issue had never been resolved
under the language of the present Louisiana act. 14 Since the
purchaser of such materials is not the final consumer of the
goods, and simply incorporates them into the building or other
structure he is constructing, some courts have concluded that
the transaction is not a sale at retail, but for resale and as such
not within the reach of the sales tax. Other courts, reaching the
same conclusion as that in the principal case, reason that the
contractor is the last person to make use of the materials in the
form of tangible, movable property and conclude that the sale
is taxable. The Louisiana act amply supports the conclusion
reached here by defining the term "retail sale" to mean "a sale
to a consumer or any other person for any purpose other than a
resale in the form of tangible personal property.""
STATE INCOME TAXATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Fontenot v. King Lumber Industries,' the collector sought
to tax as capital gain on liquidation under La. R.S. 47:159C2 the
excess in value of assets in a subsidiary Louisiana corporation
over the initial value of the stock therein when the subsidiary
was created by its Mississippi parent. The capital gain on liqui-
dation was urged to be taxable in Louisiana, although received
by an out-of-state corporation, on the authority of La. R.S.
47:159H,3 which provides that the situs of the stock in a cor-
13. See Annot., 163 A.L.R. 276 (1946).
14. In State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1935), a
case arising under the provisions of the occupational license tax, a similar result
was reached on comparable facts.
15. LA. R.S. 47:301(10) (1950).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 233 La. 965, 99 So.2d 310 (1957).
2. LA. R.S. 47:159C (1950) : "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of
a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and
amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in
part or full payment in exchange for stock. The gain or loss to the distributee
resulting from such exchange shall be determined under R.S. 47:131 but shall be
recognized only to the extent provided in R.S. 47:132 through 47:138 ....
3. LA. R.S. 47:159H (1950) : "In cases where property located in Louisiana
is received by a shareholder in the liquidation of a corporation, the stock cancelled
or redeemed in the liquidation shall, for purposes of determining taxable gain
under this Chapter, be deemed to have its taxable situs in this state to the extent
that the property of the corporation distributed in liquidation is located in Loul-
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poration holding assets in Louisiana shall be deemed to be in
Louisiana to the proportionate extent of such assets.
The court held the gain on the transfer to be non-recognized
gain on the ground that the liquidation was equivalent to a
merger, with, the basis of the property carried over to the parent
corporation unchanged. 4 The result reached is probably a good
one but not one which would have been reached under the federal
counterparts of the statute as it existed at the time Louisiana
adopted it." At that time the Bureau was apparently unwilling
to interpret the merger of a subsidiary into its parent as being
within the tax-free reorganization provisions since such an ex-
change of subsidiary property for its own stock was not specific-
ally included by Congress.8 The key provision relied upon by
taxpayer here to achieve reorganization status for the transac-
tion provides only that "no gain or loss shall be recognized if a
corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securi-
ties in another corporation a party to the reorganization." This
can hardly be read to include an exchange of property by a cor-
poration for its own stock as is the case in liquidation. Nonethe-
less, there has been no realization of gains to the parent any
more than if the property had been exchanged for stock in the
parent corporation (more typically a merger transaction) and
such stock had then been exchanged for its own stock. Since the
latter transaction would come within the literal terms of the
statute,8 no violence to the statute is done by treating the direct
exchange of property by the subsidiary for its own stock as with-
in the reorganization pattern.
siana. If only a portion of the property distributed in liquidation is located in
Louisiana, only a corresponding portion of the gain realized by a shareholder shall
be considered to be derived from Louisiana sources. Nothing in this Sub-section
shall be construed to mean that gain or loss shall be recognized upon the transfer
of property in a merger of corporations where the basis of the property in the
hands of the merging corporation is carried forward as the basis in the hands of
the continuing corporation."
4. LA. R.S. 47:133D (1950) : "No gain or loss shall be recognized if a cor-
poration a party to a reorganization exchanges property in pursuance of the plan
of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party to
the reorganization." LA. R.S. 47:138A (1950) : "As used in R.S. 47:133 . . . the
term 'reorganization' means . . . a merger or consolidation. .. ."
5. Revenue Act of 1934, § 115(c), § 112(b) (4), § 112(g).
6. Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Committee on Finance of the Senate,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 716 (1936).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. LA R.S. 47:133C (1950) : "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation
or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
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The fact that Louisiana has in 1957 adopted a more detailed
provision governing liquidation of subsidiaries9 conforming to
the federal enactment of 193510 should not mitigate against this
result. Congress was probably prompted to make such specific
provision for the tax-free liquidation of subsidiaries as a result
of the Bureau's unwillingness to interpret broadly the general
reorganization provisions. The provision has since become per-
manent and appropriately hedged about with safeguards to pre-
vent its use to exact currently taxable dividends in the form of
liquidating tax-free dividends. Likewise, as a part of the state
statute it will serve to remove tax obstacles from legitimate sim-
plifications of corporate structure but at the same time provide
safeguards which were lacking under the general reorganization
provisions."
The new liquidation of subsidiary provisions,'12 under which
the parent takes over the subsidiary assets, simply defer the
recognition of any gain in such a transaction to such time as
the parent sells to others or distributes the assets to its own
stockholders. This is accomplished by providing that the sub-
sidiary assets distributed will have the same basis in the hands
of the parent as they had in the hands of the subsidiary. 13 Since
the subsidiary has already paid income taxes on the profits which
may have purchased the increase in property, this is as it should
be. When and if the parent distributes the property to its stock-
holders in liquidation, such stockholders will then realize a capi-
tal gain (normally) consisting of the excess of the fair market
value of such property over the stockholders' basis for their
stock.14 Usually, only if the parent corporation sells or ex-
changes the property at an amount in excess of the subsidiary's
basis will the corporation have a recognized gain.15 These same
results were possible under the statute as it stood at the time the
Louisiana subsidiary of the taxpayer was dissolved; the solutions
are now more carefully limited against abuse.18
9. LA. R.S. 47:133F (1950), as amended by Act No. 434 of 1956, § 1, and
Act No. 6 of 1957, § 1.
10. 49 STAT. 1020, now § 332 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
11. See, for example, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ; see also,
Tax-Free Corporate Exchanges in the Louisiana Income Tam Law, 2 LoUISIANA
LAw REviEw 213 (1940).
12. LA. R.S. 47:133F (1950) as amended by Act No. 6 of 1957, § 1, and Act
No. 443 of 1958, § 2.
13. LA. R.S. 47:152B (1950) as amended by Act No. 443 of 1958.
14. LA. R.S. 47:1590 (1950) as amended by Act No. 443 of 1958.
15. LA. R.S. 47:42 (1950) as amended by Act No. 443 of 1958.
16. LA. R.S. 47:133-159 (1950) as amended by Act No. 443 of 1958.
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In Olvey v. Collector of Revenue,17 the ingenious and some-
what plausible argument is made that a taxpayer selling a capi-
tal asset while resident in Louisiana is entitled to take as its
basis, not its value as of the date the Louisiana income tax was
adopted (January 1, 1934),18 but its value as of the date the resi-
dent moved to Louisiana. The court, in rejecting the argument,
notes that the tax on the sale of a capital asset purports to tax
only the realization of a gain in the year in which it occurs
rather than taxing the gain as it may have accumulated over a
period of years through accretions to its value. Hence, it finds
no attempt to give extra-territoriality to a Louisiana tax when
all of the gain accruing since the Louisiana tax was adopted, if
the capital asset has been held during this period, is subjected
to tax; the taxable event is the realization of gain on a sale and
it occurs in Louisiana within a given taxable year. Seemingly,
there would be no constitutional impediment to Louisiana as-
signing the cost of stock as its basis even though acquired prior
to January 1, 1934, since the state would not be hampered in
such a step, as the federal Congress was, by constitutional inter-
pretations which required a constitutional amendment before in-
come could be taxed by the federal government. 9 The Sixteenth
Amendment, which was finally adopted March 1, 1913, conse-
quently made that date sacramental from the standpoint of Con-
gress attempting to reach income arising theretofore, whether
or not realized. No such constitutional interpretation limited
Louisiana.20
In Schlesinger v. Fontenot,21 taxpayer, who was a practicing
physician in Louisiana, acquired parcels of real estate in Ten-
nessee with buildings thereon for the purpose of consolidating
the property and making it available for purchase as a building
site. The realty acquired had buildings thereon which the tax-
payer rented in the interim prior to finding a buyer for the
entire tract and rentals and deductions in connection therewith
were handled as ordinary income and expense incurred in con-
nection with a trade or business. Upon the sale being consum-
mated, the collector now seeks to tax the gain as gain on assets
used in a trade or business excluded by definition from capital
17. 233 La. 985, 99 So.2d 317 (1958).
18. LA. R.S. 47:155 (1950).
19. See Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
20. For a comment on the federal-state distinction in power, see Tax-Free Cor-
porate Exchanges, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 213, 249-251 (1940).
21. 235 La. 47, 102 So.2d 488 (1958).
[Vol. XIX
PUBLIC LAW
assets having non-taxable status under La. R.S. 47:72 and 51.
Whether or not the taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business
of buying, selling, and renting real estate thus becomes crucial
to the decision as to the tax status of the gain realized upon the
sale.
The Court rejects the federal jurisprudence in this area which
has accorded the status of a trade or business to the ownership
and operation of even a single apartment house by a practicing
lawyer2 and holds taxpayer not engaged in a trade or business
but rather engaged only in an investment transaction, with the
rental operation as merely incidental. The court failed "to find
any evidence that the taxpayers herein gave of their time, per-
sonal attention or labor in this venture, or that they were hold-
ing it for profitable rental purposes as a trade or business."2
The reason for excluding transactions involving the sale of
depreciable assets used in a trade or business from the benefit
of capital gains treatment under the federal law24 is basically
that depreciation being at best only an estimated charge against
ordinary income, any over-depreciation should be corrected by
treating gains realized on the sale of such an asset as ordinary
income. The reason for excluding from capital asset treatment
transactions involving "property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness" is of course that such transactions deserve no special con-
cessions and should give rise to ordinary income.2 5
Louisiana carried over both the exclusion of depreciable prop-
erty and property held for sale in ordinary course from the
definition of capital assets.26 However, benefits only are derived
by a Louisiana taxpayer since losses thereby become fully de-
ductible against all other income; gains would in any event be
taxed at the same rate if realized on the sale of assets located
in Louisiana.2 7 But as to gains on the sale of capital assets
located outside the state, the statute gives complete exemption ;28
this is the rationale of the taxpayer's drive here to achieve
22. Fackler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 133 F.2d 509, 511 (6th
Cir. 1943). The court there notes: ". . . there is such a thing as carrying on a
business through agents which is in fact a common practice."
23. 102 So.2d 488, 492 (La. 1958).
24. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1221(2).
25. Id. at § 1221(1).
26. LA. R.S. 47:72 (1950).
27. LA. R.S. 47:42 (1950).
28. LA. R.S. 47:51 (1950).
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capital asset status for his Tennessee rental properties, a drive
which was rendered successful by establishing to the court's
satisfaction that he was not engaged in the "trade or business"
of renting properties or buying and selling real estate, but was
only an investor. Since the real estate sold could not then be
deemed "used in a trade or business," or held for sale in ordinary
course of trade, it remained within the definition of capital
assets.
Congress has taken care of the federal taxpayer in the cir-
cumstances here by providing that both depreciable property
and real estate used in a trade or business will, under a special
statutory formula, qualify for capital gains treatment ;29 the pro-
vision was originally enacted as a wartime measure to encourage
voluntary sales to the government but has since achieved per-
manent and expanded status.30 No such concession seems neces-
sary in connection with the administration of the state income
tax. The problem precipitated here is rather whether property
as to which income and deductions have been reported as though
used in a trade or business should nonetheless have capital asset
status when sold ;31 it would seem that, as a minimum, past re-
turns as to the property should be synchronized with the treat-
ment of the property on the return for the year of sale. In this
respect, perhaps our statute should contain a mitigating provi-
sion comparable to that which the federal statute contains and
which permits such synchronization of treatment in the event
of past errors, at least to a limited extent.3 2
In Fontenot v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, 8 the court
has occasion to consider an income tax problem not previously
before it, namely, whether advances of money to subsidiary cor-
porations by parent corporations are properly classified as loans,
deductible as bad debts upon subsequent failure in payment in
connection with the liquidation of the subsidiary,8 4 or whether
the advances are capital investments, losses as to which are en-
titled to capital loss treatment only, limited to deduction from
capital gains enjoyed during the taxable year.3 5
29. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1231.
30. See Dakin, The Capital Gains Treasure Chest-Rational Ewtension or
Empedient Distortion, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 505 (1954).
31. Possible under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1231, but not provided
for in the state statute.
32. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1311 et seq.
33. 234 La. 587, 100 So.2d 876 (1958).
34. LA. R.S. 47:58 (1950).
35. LA R.S. 47:72 (1950).
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In the portion of the case presenting the most difficulty, the
taxpayer created a subsidiary to engage in quasi experimental
production of carbon-black with authorization to spend not in
excess of $175,000 on the construction of a plant and operating
funds; the subsidiary was authorized to issue $10,000 of common
stock, $150,000 of first preferred, and $145,000 of second pre-
ferred. The advances to construct the plant were secured by the
entire issue of first preferred. Under these circumstances, con-
struction went ahead and taxpayer advanced approximately
$197,000 to its subsidiary. The project did not prosper and was
finally liquidated with only some $3,800 received therefrom by
the taxpayer. Taxpayer sought to deduct $10,000 as worthless
stock, hence deductible against ordinary income, and to deduct
the balance of unrecovered advances for construction, in the
amount of $190,200, as a bad debt also deductible in full against
ordinary income. Collector contended the entire sums advanced
were capital investments against which $3,800 was recovered on
liquidation; hence, that the stock did not become totally worth-
less but rather that taxpayer suffered a capital loss on liquida-
tion, utilizable only to the extent the taxpayer had capital gains
during the taxable period.86
The trial court also interpreted the circumstances as indi-
cating capital investment rather than loans as the intended
status of the monies advanced. It would have given taxpayer
partial relief, however, by limiting the amount to be treated as
capital investment to the outlay authorized by its Board of Di-
rectors. The court noted that under the statute37 the burden of
proof was on taxpayer to establish the status of the advances
as loans; mere want of evidence to show they were intended as
capital investment would not suffice in the absence of an af-
firmative showing that they were intended as loans. As a con-
sequence the collector's prima facie case for capital investment
status survived and his findings were deemed adequately sup-
ported. As is true of federal review of agency tax determina-
tions,38 so here, the court recognized no limitations as to ad-
ministrative finality on the scope of its review and decided the
case in the light of its analysis of the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence and of the failure on the part of the taxpayer to
carry the burden of persuasion.
36. Ibid.
37. LA. R.S. 47:1574(4) (1950).
38. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7482.
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